Causes Of World War I (2614 words) Essay Example For Students

Causes Of World War I (2614 words) Essay Causes Of World War IOn June 28, a Serbian student, Gavrilo Princip, spurred Europe into the most catastrophic event of modern history, assassinating Austrian Archduke, Francis Ferdinand. Yet, somewhere behind this simple act lies a much deeper and complex origin to a war unlike any had ever seen or even imagined. Profound improvements in war technology, growing tensions between neighboring European ethnic groups, and a comprehensive system of alliances and treaties, which all defined The First World War, resulted in the essential annihilation of an entire generation of European men and led to an equally devastating War twenty-five years later. The causes of such, and the appointment of blame, have been tenaciously argued and re-argued by historians from all perspectives and biases. This paper will also examine the question of who is to blame for World War I. The initial conclusion to the question of responsibility was handed down at the treaty of Versailles following Germanys signin g of the armistice on November 11, of 1918, ending the War. The treaty placed the blame of the war solely on Germanys shoulders, dealing her tremendously harsh punishments that ensured severe detriment to Germanys economy, military and general prestige. This would also lead a shamed Germany into a decade of despair and finger pointing that would see a radical Adolf Hitler lead his downtrodden masses into the Second World War. The Versailles treaty, plainly drafted by avaricious victors seeking exorbitant reparations on the basis of renewed sentiments of hate, prejudice and blind fury, in no way reflects the true picture of responsibility for World War I. Though Germany deserves an allotment of the blame, and possibly a greater portion than any other participant in the war does, certainly there were factors outside of Germanys control that led to the war. These factors, which find their roots dispersed throughout a half centurys time leading up to the war, include: the establishment of alliances among the leading powers of Europe, following a history of wars seeking to maintain a balance of power among these nations; nationalist ideals of unity and ethnic supremacy; and an inability by the leading statesmen of the time to work out an efficient and compromising solution to the problem at hand. Ultimately, every major power involved in the War, and the representatives of those countries, without exception, can be justly apportioned, to a greater or lesser degree, based on the aforementioned criteria, a part of the blame. The calculated system of alliances that determined the sides for World War I were carefully established in the mid-19th Century to sustain an even balance of power throughout Europe. Germanys Otto Von Bismarck established these alliances in the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian War in 1871. France, soundly defeated, lost territories in Alsace and Lorraine, as well as being handed heavy war debts, and Bismarck predicted an eventual attempt by the French to regain their land and integrity. The politically savvy Bismarck, to prevent any French aggression, organized a triumvirate of leading European powers, Germany, Austria and Italy, and formed the Triple Alliance in 1891, effectively isolating France within Europe. This, the most significant of a number of alliances established by Bismarck with other eastern powers including Russia, also allowed Germany to mediate and ease tensions as Russia and Austria continually jockeyed for dominance in the Balkans. Therefore, of the countries that made up the Triple Alliance, clearly Germany had the greatest influence on the outcome of the events leading up to World War I. Opposing Bismarcks Triple Alliance was France, Russia and Great Britains Triple Entente. France, who had obvious agitation with Germany, sought to counter the Central Powers with an alliance of its own. France immediately looked to Russia whom they knew had a fierce conflict of interest with Austria, Germanys most powerful ally. Russia, who was experiencing intense domesticate volatility, did not hesitate to join forces with a reliable French nation. Lacking from the dyad was a third power that could counter Germanys well-established military forces. England initially remained neutral, as it sought no defense or expanse of European territories. However, as the late 19th Century dragged on and Germany continued a frenetic expanse of their navy and began to challenge Britains military and economic prowess, England had no choice but to join France and Russia for Englands best interest at home and abroad. Thus, the Triple Entente was formally established in 1914 and the opposing sides of World War I had taken shape. So, what blame if any can be handed down with respect to the establishment of alliances? For Germany this question is complicated. When one examines the initial intentions of Bismarck in creating Germanys allies it is clear that Bismarck was solely devoted to the interest of peace and balance of power. He had the means and support to increase an already large German Empire but opted for a more tranquil Europe at the expense of land and economic gains. However, Bismarcks greedy successors, namely Kaiser Wilhelm, according to most contemporary sources saw the Triple Alliance as a tool to expand the German Empire. Just prior to the War Germany and the Kaiser maintained its status as a non-aggressor, saying that Germany, Is ostensibly making every effort to preserve peace and that Germany is, Ready to mediate for peace with Austria(480). The other side of the argument of German motive is presented by German historian Immanuel Geiss, who shows that the Tripl e Alliance was a German attempt to become a world power, not a world peacekeeper. Geisss essential argument is that the Triple Alliance, Was a result of the German desire to raise the Reich from the status of a continental power to that of a world power(501). Geiss is quick to note that Germanys ambitious naval program, as well as its ever-increasing influence in European affairs, as indicators of aggression. Donald Kagan, another historian, reinforces the points made by Geiss: From the late 1890s imperial Germany was fundamentally dissatisfied power, eager to disrupt the status quo and to achieve its expansive goals, by bullying if possible, by war if necessary (520). The ultimate proof of Germanys ambitious plans are spelled out in the September Program which was released immediately following the outbreak of war. German historian Fritz Fischer claims that the September Program had been established well in advance of the war and that, Germany unleashed the war precisely to achieve its purposes (518). The provisions of the plan, set in motion by the forming of the Triple Alliance, would establish Germany as the unequivocal dominant force in European economy and politics. Germany would seize lands and forge its influence over, France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Austria, Poland, and perhaps Italy, Sweden and Norway (519), as stated directly by the September Program. However, Germany was not the only country who saw the alliances as a means to advance an empire. France too was possibly guilty of having intentions other than peace in mind when forming its alliances. Max Monteglas, defending Germanys innocence, notes that France, Aimed at recovering Alsace Lorraine and also hoped to annex the Saar Basin (449). He also shows that France, in an aggressive move, Compelled England to abandon her neutrality before Belgiums neutrality was violated (452). Though Monteglass arguments are intriguing, one could easily look at Frances ambition to re-take Alsace Lorraine as j ustifiable and her eagerness to join with England as a simple matter of defense against a much stronger Germany. Like France, the nations of Austria, Russia, England and Italy all could justify their attachment to a particular alliance as a matter of self-defense against a greater force. Only for Germany did the Triple Alliance offer the potential to increase an empire and disrupt the stability of European affairs. Vie-Nam EssayThe third, and most vital mistake, belongs to Germany. Germany, seemingly determined to go to war, refused numerous offers and suggestions by primarily England to negotiate with Austria and Russia to prevent a continental war. After loudly dismissing an English proposal from Sir Edward Grey, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to convene as one of four major powers to promote a peaceful end to the increasing tensions in Europe, Germany also ignored Britains request to mediate the Balkan conflict. Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, Chancellor of the German Empire, recognized the implications of Germanys refusal to adhere to Great Britains requests: Since we have already refused one English proposal for a conference, it is impossible for us to waive a limine this English suggestion also. By refusing every proposition for mediation, we shall be held responsible by the conflagration by the whole world, and be set forth as the original instigators of the war(478). U pon German defeat four years later, the Treaty of Versailles would be based heavily on these same principles. Adjacent to Germanys lack of interest in mediation was its vehement support of any Austrian action. This position by Germany was clearly expressed by Heinrich Leonhard von Tschirschky, German Ambassador to Austria-Hungary, when he relayed to Austria, That Germany would support the Monarchy through thick and thin in whatever it might decide regarding Serbia(460). This statement is hardly a mediative plea for Austrian compromise. Austrian confidence in this statement was strengthened when Kaiser Wilhelm offered Austria Carte Blanche, or total support, in its military actions. With Germany standing strong at its back, Austria was now poised to exercise harsh military punishment on Serbia that would undoubtedly trigger Russias and the rest of Europes involvement. Had Germany instead used its influence to pacify Austrian aggression and therefore subdue Russias fears, then the conflict could have remained localized and a world war could have been prevented. It is pure speculation that Germany would have been able to pacify Austria. Austria seemed intent from the beginning to prove its power over Serbia by harsh militaristic means. It is even further speculation that in light of a German detachment from the Balkan conflict that Russia would have followed suit. Russia, seeking the same nationalistic growth as all of Europes competing powers, had a history of influence throughout the Balkan region that offered Russia potentials in economic and political expansion. Likewise, Frances involvement in the affair was not a simple matter of altruism. France sought to regain lands it had lost to Germany almost fifty years prior as well as a renewed respect as a world empire. Great Britain, though to all appearances innocent, selfishly bathed in its content while European tensions heated to a boiling point. Had Great Britain been clear on its stance from early on, then Germany may have stepped down as Europes playground bully. In light of these arguments one cannot justly apportion blame to a single nation or person. Rather, it was a collection of nations all seeking economic, military, and territorial expansion at the expense of anyone who got in their way. Driven by false ideals of ethnocentrism, all convinced of divine supremacy, the leaders and peoples of those European nations found themselves spiraling into a half a decade of absolute death and destruction. Two gunshots by a Serbian nationalist triggered billions more and one man who killed for his country caused millions to die for theirs. Yet, behind it all lay a vast and complex political structure that for reasons to be argued about but never proven, crumbled to the ground and left Europe and the world to question, why? Bibliographyworld book encyclopedia 1982max monteglasluigi albertiniHistory Essays